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Recent violent conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) has been characterized by a 
fragmentation of armed actors, lack of cohesive command structures, generalized criminality 
and banditry, and localized conflict dynamics.2 After widespread violence broke out in late 
2012 and spiked in 2013-2014, there was a brief period of relative stability and calm. Fighting 
was renewed in 2016, however, as armed factions multiplied and fought against each other. 
Throughout this period, civilian populations have experienced widespread displacement in 
CAR.3 Many civilians continue to reside in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) sites, some of 
which are under the protection of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Against this backdrop of 
upheaval and displacement, civilian populations grapple with everyday criminal threats and a 
lack of access to justice through a (mostly-absent) national criminal justice system. In keeping 
with a long tradition of popular justice and vigilantism, CAR’s displaced populations routinely 
rely on ‘self-justice’ to address crime.   
 
This brief considers the issue of everyday criminal justice in CAR and reflects on the challenges 
that low-level crimes present for international actors engaging in civilian protection activities. 
It focuses on contemporary operational dilemmas faced by international actors in CAR, 
considering the perspectives of humanitarian actors, actors from MINUSCA, displaced 
populations, local civil society, and armed actors. This brief may be read alone or alongside a 
companion brief (Research Brief 1 on CAR), which considers actors’ perceptions of who should 
be considered a civilian within the context of CAR, and international law’s relevance to the 
work of international actors.4 The field research that generated these findings was conducted 
by the author during a three-week visit to CAR in April 2019.5  
 
Responding to noted weaknesses in CAR’s domestic justice system, international protection 
and justice actors have become heavily involved in building local and hybrid criminal justice 
institutions. To date, much of the international focus has been on the criminal accountability 
                                                             
1 Author contact: Rebecca.a.sutton@gmail.com. PhD (London School of Economics), JD (University of Toronto), 
MSc (SOAS). Teaching Fellow in Human Rights Law, University of Edinburgh; SSHRC Post-Doctoral Researcher in 
the Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
2 Emma Fanning, ‘Safeguarding Distinction in the Central African Republic,’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 
Issue 62, September 2014. 
3 It is estimated that up to one million individuals were displaced as of late 2014. See Final Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic, S/2014/928 (22 December 2014). 
4 Brief 1 also provides more background context on the conflict and on intervention in CAR. 
5 Time was spent in both Bangui and Bria, including a visit to the PK3 IDP site. A total of 71 individuals were 
interviewed, through semi-structured key informant interviews and small focus group discussions. Informed 
consent was secured in all cases. To protect confidentiality, the names of individual respondents and, in some 
cases, other identifying information (such as the gender of the speaker) has been withheld.  
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of high-level perpetrators and the role of actors such as MINUSCA, the CAR Special Criminal 
Court, and the International Criminal Court in bringing alleged perpetrators to justice.6 This 
brief draws attention to the more mundane kinds of lower-level crimes and threats that 
displaced populations must grapple with on a daily basis in CAR – such as theft of a ration card 
in an IDP site. The discussion also brings this concern for everyday justice into contact with the 
broader goal of civilian protection in CAR.7  
 
The first section of the brief considers access to justice in CAR’s IDP sites from the perspective 
of local and international actors. The second section examines the ways in which MINUSCA 
handles arrest, detention and investigation of crime in the IDP sites. The third section 
addresses the ‘self-justice’ practices that CAR populations engage in, focusing on how 
international actors perceive and interact with these practices. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
The highlights of the research findings are as follows:  
 
Access to justice in CAR:  
 
Meaningful access to justice for displaced individuals who are victims of crime in CAR 
is severely constrained. IDPs express feelings of fatalism and futility in the face of 
criminal threats—such as theft, robbery, assault or sexual violence—in the IDP sites.  
Few expect state actors to deal with criminal threats, and interviewees point to a 
justice vacuum outside Bangui, the capital. While MINUSCA actors might sometimes 
step in to deal with criminal threats, ‘self-justice’ is often the main avenue pursued by 
displaced populations who have suffered criminal harm (see below). 
The relationship between justice and protection:  
Displaced populations in CAR tend to think of everyday criminal justice as a protection 
issue. They define harms expansively to include non-physical threats. They expect 
international actors to provide both justice and protection on a daily basis, and when 
MINUSCA does not step in to deal with crime IDPs feel unprotected.  
                                                             
6 For recent report on high-level accountability in CAR see: Elise Kepler, ‘Without Justice in the Central African 
Republic ‘Everything Else is Wrecked’, Human Rights Watch, 18 April 2019. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/18/without-justice-central-african-republic-everything-else-wrecked.  
7 I elected to focus on this issue after finding in South Sudan that access to everyday justice was an important 
issue to IDPs that was overlooked by international protection actors. The South Sudan findings are presented in 
a forthcoming academic paper (co-authored with Emily Paddon Rhoads) on popular and community justice 
practices.  
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There is a lack of agreement amongst various actors in CAR regarding what constitutes 
a low-level criminal threat and what is a higher-level crime that might amount to a 
conflict-related atrocity. Sometimes, a distinction is made between ordinary crime that 
one might find in any urban environment, and more systematic criminal acts that are 
targeted at a specific group of victims. Matters are complicated by the fact that it is 
often the same civilian population suffering harm in both cases – and this is of course 
the very population MINUSCA is tasked with protecting. 
International protection actors are aware that local populations in CAR link concepts 
of justice and protection. There is no clear agreement, however, on the extent to which 
MINUSCA should frame access to justice as a protection issue. While mission staff in 
Bangui propose that the UN’s protection of civilians (PoC) agenda cuts across all tasks 
the mission performs—including everyday justice—some field-based mission actors 
believe that mission leadership in Bangui wants them to compartmentalize justice and 
protection 
Challenges in arrest and detention of alleged perpetrators:  
 
Whether or not the PoC agenda is deemed to encompass everyday justice, as an 
operational matter MINUSCA routinely engages in arresting, detaining, and 
investigating crimes in the IDP sites. Two serious challenges arise here, both of which 
risk undermining the mission’s legitimacy as an intervening actor in CAR: 
 
o (i) MINUSCA struggles to balance the rights of the accused with its 
commitment to protecting civilian populations. To maintain its image as 
a PoC actor, MINUSCA must not allow dangerous criminal elements to 
circulate amongst displaced civilian populations. Separating accused 
individuals from the community for a prolonged period of time, 
however, could violate the accused’s rights and undermine MINUSCA’s 
image as a promoter of the rule of law in CAR. 
o (ii) Where MINUSCA disproportionately arrests low-level criminals 
affiliated with certain armed groups (e.g. anti-balaka), it faces 
accusations of bias that could tarnish the mission’s legitimacy overall. 
 
Self-justice in CAR and MINUSCA’s response:  
 
Local populations in CAR routinely rely on ‘self-justice’8, an expedited form of justice 
which might involve responses ranging from community mediation to violent 
                                                             
8 The terminology of ‘self-justice’ is used here because that was the term employed by the majority of 
respondents—including civilians, themselves. The term is employed in this brief loosely and broadly; it captures 
all informal, community and popular justice practices that take place outside of the state criminal justice system. 
The term ‘justice’ is potentially misleading in some instances, however. As Louisa Lombard and Sylvain Batianga-
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vigilantism. MINUSCA has struggled to delineate a definitive position with respect to 
these practices, and it is not clear which practices, if any, the mission endorses. The 
brief identifies four main challenges that the mission faces with respect to self-justice 
in CAR:  
 
o (i) The mission risks spreading itself too thin. 
o (ii) Support for self-justice could interfere with the mission’s efforts to 
extend the reach of national law. 
o (iii) The mission might condone justice practices—such as mob 
violence—that fall afoul of its principles and commitments.  
o (iv) The mission might endorse justice meted out by armed groups who 
are harming local populations under cover of the ‘justice provider’ label.  
 
However fraught such engagement is, the brief cautions that not taking a position on 
self-justice is not a viable option for MINUSCA either. Failing to confront these issues 
head on may generate serious legitimacy problems for the mission. 
Reflecting its academic nature and purpose, this briefing note does not prescribe concrete 
policy solutions but rather articulates fundamental questions that underlie the daily practices 
of international protection and justice actors in CAR. It therefore seeks to instigate fresh 
thinking amongst international actors regarding the relationship between protection and 
justice, the effects of current efforts to pursue these agendas, and how those efforts might be 
reformed.  
 
1.0 Criminal threats and access to justice in CAR’s IDP sites 
 
This section focuses on access to justice issues and the everyday criminal threats that 
displaced populations face in CAR. It also examines various actors’ perceptions of the 
relationship between civilian protection and criminal justice. The findings presented here 
suggest that it will be important for MINUSCA to further clarify whether—and if so, how—
everyday justice should be conceptualized as part of the mission’s PoC agenda.  
1.1 Access to justice in the IDP sites: local actors’ perspectives 
  ‘There are threats, and theft. There’s nothing you can do.’ 
      -IDP in Cathedral site, Bria 
 
‘Justice should work together with protection, it’s obvious.’ 
                                                             
Kinzi point out, ‘justice’ terminology lends a moral quality that is often lacking in the practices in question (they 
replace ‘popular justice’ with ‘popular punishment’). See Louisa Lombard and Sylvain Batianga-Kinzi, ‘Violence, 




    -Paralegal, PK3 IDP site 
 
This discussion outlines some access to justice issues that displaced population in CAR are 
facing, focusing on criminal-type threats. In interviews conducted in Bria and the PK3 IDP site, 
the following types of threats are repeatedly mentioned: simple theft; robbery involving 
weapons, often with some threat or use of force; threats of serious violence such as physical 
assault or murder; rape and other forms of sexual violence; murder, which is now relatively 
rare. All of these crimes might be perpetrated by other civilians or by armed groups.9 
When discussing access to justice in CAR, IDPs and local civil society actors move fluidly 
between low-level and high-level crime, as well as between everyday criminal threats and the 
wider conflict. While everyone who was interviewed for this study agreed that killing or 
murder is a serious, high-level type of crime and that most thefts are low-level crime, there 
seems to be no clear agreement amongst local actors regarding the categorization of sexual 
violence. Some IDPs, for example, characterize rape in PK3 as a small crime to be dealt with 
privately by families,10 while others think it is a serious crime that forms part of an armed 
conflict paradigm—thus demanding the attention of MINUSCA and specifically UNPOL. Even 
the seemingly small crime of theft can traverse the low and high-level categories. A one-off 
theft of a ration card by a neighbour, for example, will be viewed differently from theft or 
looting that is carried out by armed actors (brackage). Where the crime is more systematic 
and aimed at individuals who are deemed loyal to the opposition, IDPs are more likely to 
situate this type of harm as part of the wider conflict.  
While an IDP bloc leader in PK3 observes that overt conflict has diminished after the peace 
agreements, he feels this cannot be trusted: ‘Every time, the war starts again. Our homes are 
burned, we are looted. Of course I want justice.’11 This individual initially seems to use the 
term ‘justice’ to refer to the arrests of high-level perpetrators in the context of the armed 
conflict, but when asked who is responsible for delivering justice he sets his sights on an 
informal, local resource: a camp-based family mediation program run by local paralegals.12 
To say that something is viewed by local populations as an everyday criminal matter is not to 
say that it is negligible or harmless to those who experience it or live under threat of it. Small 
crimes like theft of food rations or ration cards, for example, can disturb relationships within 
                                                             
9 This brief focuses on the international response to crimes committed by local actors, and as such it does not 
address crimes perpetrated by international actors in CAR – such as alleged sexual abuse of local populations by 
UN mission actors. It can be expected that such criminal activity has a serious impact on the mission’s legitimacy 
in dealing with criminal justice and providing protection.  
10 As discussed in Section 3 of this brief, MINUSCA actors voice discomfort with such private arrangements. 
11 Interview with IDP block leader in PK3, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
12 Such mediation mechanisms will be discussed in the third section of this brief. 
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the IDP site and impact who has access to the basic necessities of life. Moreover, such acts 
cannot feasibly be ignored by MINUSCA and international humanitarian actors, as it is the 
international aid system that has introduced the objects being stolen into the community. 
While the theft of World Food Program (WFP) food rations in PK3 has been a problem, it is 
reportedly less common in 2019 than in previous years. 13 Mission actors attribute the 
decrease in food aid theft to the presence of MINUSCA forces at the aid distributions, though 
this is disputed.14    
While, as mentioned, crimes in PK3 are only sometimes seen as tied to the armed conflict, it 
is striking how consistently IDPs treat the issue of crime in CAR as a protection matter. When 
asked how justice and protection relate to one another, a female IDP in PK3 answers they are 
‘aguako’ – Sangho for ‘they are one and the same’.15 A local paralegal based in PK3 also 
suggests that those working on justice within the UN mission need to collaborate more with 
those mission actors doing PoC work: ‘Justice should work together with protection, it’s 
obvious’.16 The paralegal also highlights the lack of meaningful access to justice in PK3: ‘Up 
until now, there hasn’t been justice. If the authorities came to Bria, then maybe.’ 17  For their 
part, a group of female IDPs—who are the beneficiaries of an INGO program in PK3—report 
that small crimes and robbery in PK3 are routinely ignored. One female IDP explains: ‘There’s 
no justice. Even police are scared. Cases of rape and murder are with UNPOL, but nothing for 
smaller crimes.’18  
Many IDPs express feelings of fatalism and futility in the face of criminal threats they 
encounter in CAR’s IDP sites. An IDP residing in the Cathedral area in Bria, which is located 
near to but not inside PK3, states: ‘There are threats, and theft. There’s nothing you can do’.19 
When asked whether they tend to report these incidents, one IDP replies: ‘You can report it 
but there’s no point’. Another says simply, ‘Here, there is no justice’.20 IDPs note that armed 
groups such as ex-seleka and FPRC21 might deliver justice elsewhere in CAR, but not here in 
Bria’s Cathedral site. When asked what these armed actors would do if IDPs called them to 
step in, one IDP flatly responds: ‘Nothing’.22  
                                                             
13 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
14 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
15 Interview with four female IDPs in PK3, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
16 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
17 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
18 Interview with four female IDPs in PK3, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
19 Focus group with ten IDPs in the Cathedral area, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
20 Focus group with ten IDPs in the Cathedral area, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
21 Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique. 
22 Focus group with ten IDPs in the Cathedral area, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
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For their part, some armed actors emphasize that the responsibility for dealing with crime in 
Bria and PK3 lies with state actors. An FPRC member in Bria expects the Gendarmerie to be 
the first port of call for addressing crime in the area, noting that in certain cases MINUSCA will 
get involved.23 Another FPRC member contends the mission’s presence is too thin, however, 
and that the FPRC has thus assumed responsibility for providing security in Bria town. He 
reports that UNPOL is not functioning outside of the PK3 site: ‘Where is UNPOL? I don’t see 
them.’24 A MINUSCA official in Bria concedes that these allegations have some truth to them, 
as UNPOL patrols are focused on PK3 and tend to go to Bria town only for ‘mob control’.25  
The next section considers MINUSCA and other international actors’ perspectives on access to 
justice in more detail, highlighting competing views on whether everyday justice constitutes a 
protection matter. 
1.2 Access to justice in the IDP sites: international actors’ perspectives 
 
‘When MINUSCA doesn’t deal with crime, IDPs say ‘you don’t protect us’, so 
criminality and protection is very confused for most people.’ 
      -MINUSCA actor, Bria 
 
‘The link between PoC and justice is clear at the most senior levels of MINUSCA… 
We get these instructions that justice is PoC all the time.’ 
      -MINSUCA actor, Bangui 
 
UNPOL staff in Bria report a dramatic improvement in stability in the wake of the Khartoum26 
and Bria27 peace agreements. Displaced populations are venturing further out of PK3 to 
cultivate their crops and local markets are beginning to recover in Bria.28 However, UN mission 
staff note that criminal threats continue to affect daily life inside PK3. Many believe that the 
main perpetrators are unemployed and idle male youth residing in the site. According to an 
UNPOL actor in Bria, ‘When they are stuck inside a site, for the youth the only option is to turn 
to crime. There is a sense of impunity.’29 Despite ongoing Disarmament, Demobilization and 
                                                             
23 Interview with FPRC actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
24 Interview with FPRC actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
25 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. The overlap of policing and armed conflict paradigms is 
addressed in Research Brief 1 on CAR. 
26 See ‘Central African Republic: UN Chief Hails Signing of New Peace Agreement’, UN News, 6 February 2019. 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032091. 
27 See ‘Central African Republic: Six Armed Groups Sign Peace Agreement in Bria’, Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue Report, 11 April 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-
six-armed-groups-sign-peace-agreement-bria. 
28 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
29 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
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Reintegration (DDR) initiatives and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) run by UN mission actors, high 
levels of unemployment persist.30  
 
An UNPOL official in Bangui observes that it would be normal for any urban centre from Tunis 
to New York to have crime, but proposes that crime in CAR goes beyond opportunistic urban 
crime. When criminal acts are targeted at particular victims because of their perceived 
affiliations to an armed group, for example, criminal harms interact with the conflict in a way 
that demands a novel kind of response.31 It is often difficult, however, to distinguish conflict-
related criminal acts from ordinary criminal justice matters. Such an untangling may indeed 
be impossible in some instances: seemingly isolated criminal acts, for example, can foment 
inter-family and inter-communal conflicts.  
The crucial question that arises for MINUSCA and other international actors in this setting is 
whether everyday justice matters should properly be considered part of the mission’s PoC 
agenda. The canvassed views of international actors on this question can be distilled into two 
competing approaches: the first approach conceptualizes everyday justice as a separate 
matter from protection, and the second understands criminal justice as part and parcel of 
civilian protection efforts. As will be made evident, the dividing line between these 
approaches is not a bright one.  
 Approach 1: Everyday justice is a separate concern from the PoC agenda 
Some international actors operating in CAR believe that issues of criminality and protection 
should be kept conceptually separate and differentiated from one another. For those who 
espouse this approach, the tendency of local populations to conflate the two issues can be 
vexing. A MINUSCA official based in Bria explains: ‘When MINUSCA doesn’t deal with crime, 
IDPs say ‘you don’t protect us’, so criminality and protection is very confused for most people. 
It’s not just a communication issue. Anything that affects them physically, their freedom, 
goods, dignity, they see it as PoC.’ Interviews with IDPs in and around PK3 suggest that the 
concept of protection extends even further, to include non-physical threats. 
Some international actors in Bria insist that criminal justice issues in PK3 should be left to state 
justice actors, such as the Gendarmerie. This is partly a matter of fit, as MINUSCA is deemed 
to be incapable of dealing with low-level crime issues. One humanitarian actor remarks: ‘If you 
                                                             
30 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. Local civil society actors in Bangui also flag the issue of 
youth unemployment, describing it as ‘a crisis for youth that isn’t new’. One local NGO actor emphasises the 
importance of building up youth in CAR and creating opportunities for them other than criminal or armed group 
activity (Interview with two local civil society actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019). 
31 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
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have a problem with your wife, or a theft, MINUSCA can’t help.’32 This begs the question of 
who should step in in the absence of action by the Gendarmerie. As will be discussed in Section 
3 of this brief, ‘self-justice’ by local actors routinely fills the gap – and, indeed, is part of a 
longer tradition of popular justice and punishment in CAR. 
For those who believe MINUSCA should stick to a narrow and manageable PoC agenda, 
practical problems arise in the attempt to define what is properly considered a protection-
related task. A criminal-type attack against the residents of the PK3 site, for example, might 
be carried out in retaliation for something anti-balaka have done. A Bria-based MINUSCA actor 
says such attacks are the most difficult to categorize, and proposes that in the absence of a 
clear war-like pattern it is preferable to treat criminal incidents as isolated (human rights) 
violations.33 This individual elaborates:34 
All people of PK3 are seen as legitimate to attack by others, so we protect the 
camp. We have five checkpoints, just to prevent movement of large armed 
elements. It’s worked mostly because armed groups don’t see it as in their interest 
to attack the camp. It’s better to steal, or abuse women. Here, it’s criminal 
violence. We are between the two. We take a permanent posture with respect to 
the conflict and view the IDP camp within a conflict domain. So, we try to cover it 
as PoC. But individual crimes are individual crimes. 
Such accounts centre classical PoC work and its focus on direct physical protection. Any moves 
made to address everyday crime are deemed to shift the mission into an awkward posture 
that fits somewhere between providing physical protection and addressing criminal violence. 
This blurring of realms is compounded when MINUSCA actors alternately claim to be operating 
in an armed conflict paradigm or a policing-style paradigm.35  
Whatever difficulties arise in differentiating justice and protection matters in practice, some 
Bria-based MINUSCA actors evidently try to do so because they believe this is the instruction 
from Bangui. 36 As will be discussed below, however, high-level MINUSCA staff in the capital 
expound an approach that explicitly joins up justice and protection concerns. 
 Approach 2: Everyday justice is a PoC concern  
                                                             
32 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
33 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
34 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
35 This issue of competing paradigms was addressed in Research Brief 1 on CAR, Section 2 (‘The Relevance of 
International Humanitarian Law in CAR’). 
36 Note that these were mainly protection actors and UNPOL, rather than justice actors per se. A MINUSCA actor 
in Bangui suggests that full-time justice staff would have framed things differently. 
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As noted earlier, local populations tend to conceptualize criminal justice as a protection issue. 
One humanitarian actor in Bria proposes that it only makes sense for international interveners 
to adopt an understanding of problems that mirrors the way that locals themselves 
understand them.37 Another humanitarian rejects the premise that crime and protection are 
separate issues, saying that criminal justice in CAR falls under MINUSCA’s mandate to protect 
the population.38 Framing criminal justice issues as protection issues is thus a way of assigning 
responsibility, so as to trigger a response by the mission. One might also point out here that it 
is often the same civilian population—the very population that MINUSCA is tasked with 
protecting—that suffers the harm of criminal threats and more conventional protection 
threats.  
A further reason to integrate concerns of everyday justice with civilian protection is the natural 
overlap between these matters and the difficulty of teasing them apart. Justice issues often 
encompass, or morph into, protection problems. A particular concern for the UN mission is 
the potential for low-level crime to catalyse and sustain cycles of violence, and for criminal 
elements to serve as peace spoilers. A UNPOL official says of crime and instability in PK3: ‘We 
want calm in the camp, and crime impacts that. Crime can degenerate into family conflict and 
lead to the destabilization of the IDP camps. Small crimes can totally destabilize the peace.’39 
On the subject of inter-family spats, another MINUSCA actor adds: ‘A family issue—you go 
deeper into the matter and find some personal disputes. Eventually it boils down to a criminal 
act.’40 In the absence of meaningful access to justice, these cycles of violence are difficult to 
interrupt.41 
In the same way that justice issues may generate protection issues, a protection problem may 
involve or lead to a justice violation. The intentional targeting of civilian populations in CAR, 
for example, may be viewed as an international justice issue that demands a high-level 
response—for example by justice actors such as the ICC or CAR’s Special Criminal Court. 
Many high-level MINUSCA staff in Bangui articulate a clear link between issues of crime and 
the PoC mandate. They point out that PoC is supposed to be mainstreamed across all tasks 
that the mission performs, including criminal justice at the local level. A MINUSCA justice actor 
in Bangui identifies local criminal justice systems as the single most important factor in 
securing access to justice in CAR, and maintains that this is properly understood as a PoC 
issue.42 PoC is treated here as an exhaustive package, with access to justice as an extra 
                                                             
37 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
38 Focus group with five humanitarian actors, Bria, 24 April 2019. 
39 Interview with UNPOL actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
40 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
41 Focus group with five humanitarian actors, Bria, 24 April 2019. 
42 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 27 April 2019. 
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protection ‘tool’ or means for an overstretched mission that cannot be everywhere all the 
time.43  The same MINUSCA official quoted above adds: 
The link between PoC and justice is clear at the most senior levels of MINUSCA… 
We get these instructions that justice is PoC all the time. It’s a mega transversal 
issue, PoC. In our respective mandates each of us have a little role to play—for 
example, having a well-maintained prison. 
Another MINUSCA actor in Bangui adds that everyone working for the mission is in essence a 
PoC actor—whether they are working in PoC, Justice and Corrections, Human Rights, the Joint 
Operations Centre (JOC), or the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC): ‘No matter what role 
you have, the overall mandate is protection of civilians’.44  
While this mindset is asserted amongst mission leadership in Bangui, it does not seem to 
trickle down to MINUSCA staff outside the capital. Some Bria-based MINUSCA actors might 
personally espouse the view that everyday justice is a PoC issue, but they do not generally see 
this as the mission’s official position. As noted earlier, one MINUSCA official in Bria also 
describes IDP claims about the connection between justice and protection as ‘confused’.45 
While this suggests a potential disconnect between Bangui and field level, differences in 
rhetoric might not necessarily translate into a measurable difference in implementation. As a 
practical matter, some mission actors in Bria who conceptualize justice and protection as 
separate issues are still actively engaged in both traditional PoC work and criminal justice-type 
tasks.46 Still, the lack of a shared vision across the mission regarding engagement with 
everyday justice could generate operational problems for MINUSCA. This uncertainty 
resurfaces, for example, in MINUSCA’s response to ‘self-justice’ in CAR (see Section 3). 
The next section of the brief delves into routine criminal justice tasks implemented by mission 
staff in Bria and PK3, such as arrest, investigation and detention of alleged perpetrators. The 
aim of this part of the discussion is to further explore the operational challenges mission actors 
face in dealing with everyday crime, whether or not such tasks are conceptualized as PoC 
work. 
2.0 MINUSCA’s response to crime in the IDP sites 
 
‘We won’t fly them to Bangui if they have stolen a mango’ 
                                                             
43 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 27 April 2019. 
44 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 12 April 2019. 
45 See above in this section. 
46 One UNPOL actor in Bria says it is UNPOL and MINUSCA’s joint task to ‘do protection and stop crimes…We’re 
trying to prevent and stop all types of crime, including other crime that is not specific to IDPs.’ Interview with 
three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
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     -MINUSCA official, Bangui  
 
As noted earlier in this brief, access to justice for ordinary people in CAR in the face of crime 
is extremely limited. Many international actors voice concerns that a justice vacuum has been 
generated in CAR as state justice actors have fled to the capital in the face of violent threats.47 
Leaving aside for the moment the way in which local actors pursue justice through informal 
mechanisms (See Section 3), this section examines MINUSCA’s direct engagement in criminal 
justice-related tasks in and around PK3. As will be shown, significant issues arise for MINUSCA 
and specifically UNPOL when interacting with criminal elements. Two main challenges will be 
highlighted here with respect to MINUSCA’s engagement with low-level crime, namely: the 
need to balance the rights of the accused with community protection, and perceptions of 
mission bias. 
 2.1 MINUSCA’s engagement with low-level crime 
Under the urgent temporary measures (UTM) mandate MINUSCA has the mandate to arrest 
and detain,48 but will generally only take this action when national justice actors are not 
present or not capable of doing so.49  
Interviews with UN actors in Bangui suggest that there are two types of arrests the mission 
may carry out in CAR: those for incidents involving potential International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law violations, which may be of interest to international 
justice bodies like the ICC, and those for smaller crimes.50 Perpetrators of the latter type of 
crime are routinely released back into the population. As one MINUSCA official states, ‘We 
won’t fly them to Bangui if they have stolen a mango.’ 51 If the crimes in question are more 
serious however—in one official’s words, ‘rape or problem for peace’—then the Transfer Task 
Force will transfer prisoners to Bangui if the (national) Prosecutor decides this is warranted.  52  
Some members of the UN mission did not anticipate that they would engage so directly with 
low-level crime in CAR. According to one MINUSCA actor, the mission set up the UTM mandate 
to quickly restore basic law and order ‘because there was absolutely nothing here. But it’s 
developed far beyond what we perceived’.53 Instead of focusing on potential peace spoilers, 
                                                             
47 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bria, 26 April 2019 (arguing justice actors were too quick to flee); 
Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 27 April 2019 (arguing the threats made against justice actors were 
serious and genuine). 
48 The Urgent Temporary Measure mandate is outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 2448 (2018) and 2387 
(2017). 
49 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. 
50 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 15 April 2019. 
51 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 15 April 2019. 
52 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 15 April 2019. 
53 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. 
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MINUSCA thus finds itself grappling with questions such as what to do if they witness a theft  
or if local police fail to deal with sexual violence.54 A humanitarian actor in Bria contends that 
this is a good thing, and that the mission needs to deal with all crimes in PK3 to avoid an 
atmosphere of impunity. Invoking the prospect of uninterrupted cycles of day-to-day violence, 
this individual remarks: ‘If a person stays hidden in the community, it just continues’.55  
The next part of the discussion considers decisions to release individuals back into the 
community after an arrest. 
 2.2 The rights of the accused 
When crimes are committed outside Bangui, the local population will sometimes arrest an 
alleged perpetrator and ask MINUSCA to detain them. If MINUSCA accepts the request, the 
mission puts the perpetrator in Temporary Detention Facilities and UNPOL proceeds with an 
investigation.56 The alleged perpetrator will either be released or transferred to Bangui and 
handed over to national authorities. MINUSCA can detain someone in the temporary facilities 
for 72 hours, a time-frame that can potentially be extended multiple times.  
When deciding whether to transfer accused individuals from the field sites to Bangui, 
MINUSCA also considers issues of prison overcrowding in the capital. MINUSCA might release 
an accused individual to avoid exceeding prison capacity, even if it poses a problem for the 
community in which the crime occurred.57 This points to a conundrum the mission must 
grapple with, namely how to balance the rights of the accused with the protection of local 
populations.  
On the one hand, the mission comes under pressure for holding alleged perpetrators for too 
long; but equally, MINUSCA is criticized when it opts to quickly release accused individuals 
back into the community.58 While extending the detention timeframe can provide the mission 
with more time to carry out proper investigations and keep the accused individual out of the 
community, it may also violate the accused’s rights.59 There thus seems to be a trade-off 
between community security and respecting the rights of the accused, with no clear guidance 
at mission level on how to resolve it. Two specific concerns arise here for MINUSCA. First, the 
                                                             
54 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. Again, there are differing views on what is 
considered high-level or low-level crime in CAR. 
55 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
56 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. 
57 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. An area for further inquiry is MINUSCA’s role in 
providing security, protection and deterrence in Bangui prisons. In particular, the use of force by UN mission 
actors in the case of prison unrest merits attention (Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 15 April 2019. 
58 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019; Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 
2019. 
59 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. 
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mission’s legitimacy as a PoC actor may be undermined where criminal elements are re-
introduced into protected IDP settings such as PK3. Second, violations of the accused’s rights 
at the arrest, investigation and detention stages could also interfere with MINUSCA’s stated 
intention of promoting the rule of law in CAR. As will now be discussed, a further challenge 
arises with respect to perceptions of mission bias. 
 2.3 Accusations of bias 
The mission has faced accusations by armed actors that its response to crime in CAR is biased, 
specifically that anti-balaka members are disproportionately arrested.60 In interviews, anti-
balaka ask how the UN justifies arresting and holding their people for ‘small crimes’, while 
failing to send high-level war criminals to prison.61 A MINUSCA official deflects such 
accusations by articulating the difficulty of going after bigger fish:62 
But they need to understand, for us to catch big guys, we need a huge element of 
surprise. How are we expecting MINUSCA, with comparatively light force and 
limited surveillance to get these established, well-known perpetrators? …The PoC 
mandate says that we have to consider, what will you get out of it? Is it the right 
moment? An opportune time? 
A subtext of the critique from anti-balaka actors (most of whom are Christian) is that there is 
a pro-Muslim bias on the part of certain MINUSCA contingents.63 While MINUSCA actors 
vehemently reject such claims, they are quick to concede that the mission lacks the dedicated 
resources to adequately respond to crime overall.64 At the same time as anti-balaka often feel 
over-policed by MINUSCA, they also contend that the mission is not doing enough to address 
the issue of bandits in PK3.65 In keeping with the fuzzy treatment of the boundary between 
crime and armed conflict in CAR, one anti-balaka member defines bandits as those who ‘hurt 
or kill civilians’. 66 
As this section of the brief has shown, whether or not MINUSCA explicitly frames its 
engagement with criminal justice as part of the PoC mandate, criminal activity in CAR 
generates serious dilemmas for the mission. In addition to grappling with issues of protecting 
the rights of the accused and perceptions of bias, MINUSCA must also decide how to react 
                                                             
60 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 14 April 2019. This is reported particularly with respect to Bangui and 
PK3. 
61 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
62 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
63 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. The Mauritanian contingents are mentioned as one 
example. 
64 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
65 Interview with anti-balaka actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
66 Interview with anti-balaka actor, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
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when local populations take justice into their own hands. The third, and final, section of this 
brief describes the dilemmas that arise for the mission in connection with the everyday justice 
practices that local populations resort to in CAR.  
3.0 MINUSCA’s response to ‘self-justice’ in CAR 
 
‘Justice is slow. It takes a long time for justice to happen. But people also do quick justice.’ 
    -Local civil society actor, Bangui 
 
‘The problem is that the population resorts to popular justice, so we have to deal with it.’ 
-UNPOL actor, Bria 
 
The design and implementation of effective protection and justice policies by international 
actors in CAR must also contend with the reality that affected individuals and communities 
themselves adopt a variety of responses to the criminal threats and other everyday harms that 
they face. Such practices are typically referred to by local populations themselves as ‘self-
justice’.67 This section explores practices of ‘self-justice’ in CAR and examines the response of 
international actors to such practices. When MINUSCA officials speak about the criminal 
justice system in CAR, they typically refer to a formal, state-sponsored system that applies 
CAR’s national penal code. The tendency here is to cite a justice vacuum, rather than to 
pronounce on particular laws or practices that should be condemned or condoned—for 
example, because they fall afoul of international human rights law. A point of particular 
interest for this brief is the fact that MINUSCA has not yet made clear its position on the 
legitimacy of popular justice practices68 in CAR. It will be suggested here that it is important 
for MINUSCA to clarify its position on these matters. 
3.1 Self-justice in the IDP sites 
 
IDPs often rely on block leaders within the site, other local authorities or armed groups—such 
as anti-balaka in PK3—to address everyday crime. In the absence of any response by such 
actors, or by international actors such as the UN, ordinary members of the population may 
also address the issue themselves.69 An INGO actor reports, perhaps hyperbolically: ‘People 
just do self-justice. If someone is stealing from someone else, they can be lynched by their 
                                                             
67 See footnote 8, above on how ‘self-justice’ is defined in this brief. 
68 Many respondents to this study treated this larger group of justice practices as specific iterations of ‘self-
justice’. While this brief follows this approach, more research is needed to untangle and categories the different 
types of justice that fall outside of the state criminal justice system.  
69 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bangui, 13 April 2019. 
 17 
neighbours.’ An UNPOL actor surmises that this kind of vigilante popular justice is not only the 
custom in CAR but is also the kind of justice that populations prefer.70 
In fact, it seems that the preference for self-justice is often shaped by the belief that local 
populations have constrained or no access to the ‘slow justice’ associated with court 
proceedings and other formalized criminal justice mechanisms. Women are reported to have 
particular difficulty accessing slow justice, due to factors such as a lack of knowledge about 
their rights, lack of (financial) resources, and insecurity preventing physical access to justice 
institutions.71 Displaced women are also likely to live in fear if the perpetrator of a crime 
remains within the same IDP site as them, an issue which again highlights MINUSCA’s 
conundrum of balancing the accused’s rights with community protection.72 Self-justice 
emerges as an appealing prospect for displaced individuals, both male and female, who have 
been the victims of crime in CAR.  
At one end of the spectrum, this expedited informal justice might involve (mostly) benign 
practices such as mediation by community leaders or paralegals. As mentioned in Section 1 of 
this brief, there is a small group of paralegals who serve as the focal point for mediation of 
disputes in PK3. They deal with all kinds of community disputes, as well as administrative 
issues like ensuring that birth certificates are available. 73 When there is a serious criminal case 
in PK3—which these paralegals define as sexual violence or murder—they will generally 
involve the UN mission.74 These local actors do not expect national actors working within 
CAR’s criminal justice system to respond, and so they deem MINUSCA and UNPOL responsible 
for dealing with higher-level justice problems.75 Coming back to the issue of the overlap 
between justice and protection, the paralegals also emphasize that maintaining peace at the 
household level in PK3 is necessary for ensuring calm and stability in the area.76  
At the other end of the self-justice spectrum there are vigilante practices and mob violence.77 
There are verifiable reports of local actors detaining people so that they can extort a fine from 
them,78 and of communities staging live burials of women alleged to have committed 
                                                             
70 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
71 Interview with local civil society actor, Bangui, 19 April 2019. 
72 Interview with local civil society actor, Bangui, 19 April 2019. 
73 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
74 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
75 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. One paralegal says: ‘We give justice over to justice – 
the UN’. 
76 Interview with two local paralegals, Bria, 26 April 2019. 
77 Interview with local civil society actor, Bangui, 19 April 2019. 
78 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 27 April 2019. Interview with humanitarian actor, Bangui, 13 April 2019.  
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witchcraft.79 The following section considers MINUSCA’s fraught engagement with such forms 
of justice, along with the issue of justice delivered by armed groups in CAR. 
3.2 MINUSCA’s position on self-justice 
 
At this juncture it is important for the mission to clarify just what MINUSCA and UNPOL 
understand to qualify as valid ‘law’ in CAR, and whether there is consensus that certain 
traditional justice practices are extra-legal or insupportable for some other reason. 
Ascertaining what forms of criminal justice response by local populations the mission is willing 
to condone is a separate matter from the question of whether low-level criminal justice should 
properly be considered a PoC concern. Nonetheless, it generates similarly pressing legitimacy 
issues for the mission. 
MINSUCA and UNPOL actors interviewed for this study tend to lump all forms of self-justice 
together, and to treat these practices collectively as non-legal. One MINUSCA actor says the 
following of community responses to everyday harms: ‘Conflicts related to family, forced 
marriage, problems with the gestation of animals, these are low level infractions. Mechanisms 
[to address them] exist in fact, not in law.’80 It seems that there are two reasons why these 
practices are not viewed by mission actors as ‘law’. Firstly, these informal mechanisms are not 
state-sanctioned or addressed in national legislation.81 Secondly, the interpretation of what is 
legal is tied up with value judgments about the legitimacy, desirability and fairness of the 
practice in question.  
One UNPOL actor in Bria contends that even if self-justice practices in CAR are not considered 
law in the traditional sense, the mission does not have the option of simply looking away.82 
Engaging directly with popular justice practices presents numerous challenges for the mission, 
however, four of which will be articulated here.  
First, MINUSCA risks spreading itself too thin if it embarks on a concerted engagement with 
self-justice practices. This is especially so if criminal justice is increasingly brought within the 
fold of the PoC mandate, a prospect contemplated in this brief. Contemplating this 
eventuality, one MINUSCA actor laments: ‘Now MINUSCA has to deal with it all, as though it’s 
us for every domain’.83  
                                                             
79 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bangui, 13 April 2019; Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 18 April 2019.  
80 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019.  
81 One individual states that all of MINUSCA’s work ‘is according to Central African law…we have to follow it.’ 
(Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019). 
82 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
83 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
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Second, in endorsing self-justice practices in CAR, MINUSCA runs the risk of limiting the reach 
of national law and state justice mechanisms. While, as noted, there has been a reported 
justice vacuum outside the capital (especially as justice actors have fled to Bangui), MINUSCA 
is actively engaged in supporting state justice actors and re-building CAR’s justice institutions. 
Sanctioning community practices outside the national legal system could interfere with the 
mission’s work to bolster the state. 
Third, MINUSCA might (be seen to) endorse justice practices that violate the principles the 
mission espouses, such as respect for human rights law. When local communities elect to 
repair harms privately for example, they sometimes call for fines to be paid between 
individuals or families as compensation. A conundrum arises for MINUSCA when these kinds 
of financial transactions are made in response to sexual violence; several MINUSCA actors 
argue that such crimes are too serious to be dealt with through traditional justice 
mechanisms.84 While it is intimated here that the community justice practices in question are 
not legitimate legal practices, MINUSCA has yet to take an unequivocal stance on the issue.  
Also related to the above point, the mission struggles in the face of violent self-justice 
practices. Vigilante violence against individuals accused of witchcraft—who tend to be 
women—constitutes an oft-mentioned example. Intriguingly, many international actors 
interviewed for this study discuss witchcraft—or, more precisely, threats of violence by local 
populations against individuals accused of witchcraft—as both a justice and a PoC issue. 
MINUSCA has in the past relocated at-risk individuals accused of witchcraft in PK3 to other 
sites, such as Bambari. The mission has also offered physical protection by doing patrols 
around the accused individual’s house or allowing them to wait inside detention facilities for 
time to pass. One UNPOL actor frames the safeguarding of those accused of witchcraft as a 
human rights issue,85 while another UNPOL actor proposes that it is PoC work, especially 
because people are sheltered inside the UN base (‘If their life is under threat, we need a 
protection solution’).86 A Bria-based official voices approval for this kind of holistic approach, 
adding: ‘It’s an integrated mission’.87 The fact that witchcraft is codified as a crime in CAR’s 
criminal legislation introduces further complications: local actors who attempt to punish those 
accused of witchcraft point to this national law in support of their (sometimes violent) 
actions.88   
                                                             
84 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019.  
85 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. Inside the MINUSCA base in Bria, there is a makeshift 
prison and also an informal shelter where at-risk individuals might be offered temporary protection.  
86 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
87 Interview with three UNPOL actors, Bria, 25 April 2019. 
88 Discussed in Interview with humanitarian actor, Bangui, 13 April 2019; Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 
18 April 2019. 
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A fourth challenge arises where it is armed groups that are meting out criminal justice in 
CAR.89 Local populations often expect armed actors to assume this role, especially when state 
actors have absconded from their responsibilities of providing law and order.90 Evincing 
wariness, one humanitarian actor proposes that armed actors use the ‘justice provider’ label 
as a pretext to extort payments from accused individuals.91 Even where the relevant practices 
are non-violent and contribute towards the maintenance of public order, it may be 
problematic for the mission to condone justice by armed actors. As one MINUSCA actor in 
Bangui explains: ‘Armed groups are going out and arresting people. UN cannot support this, 
because it’s not within an official established system. Even if we have seen sometimes that it 
helps to address issues of justice, at the same time it’s illegal.’92 Circling back to the third 
challenge mentioned above, the problem deepens when armed groups engage in justice 
practices that are violent or in clear violation of international law, as when armed actors kill 
individuals suspected of committing crimes without credible evidence or due process.93  
In light of these identified challenges, it is understandable that MINUSCA might hesitate to 
make clear public declarations about what it views as the right or wrong kind of justice in CAR. 
Further, if MINUSCA makes explicit pronouncements on what is not allowable, the mission 
may be construed as condoning all other conduct it does not expressly prohibit. The mission 
could also attract (further) accusations of bias where it draws attention to problematic justice 
practices of certain actors but not others.94 Having enumerated the downsides, the fact 
remains that the mission’s failure to stake out a clear position on self-justice also carries 
serious costs – potentially undermining MINUSCA’s legitimacy as a protection and justice actor 
in CAR. 
 Conclusion 
This brief has identified some challenges that arise in providing protection to local populations 
in CAR, drawing attention to an issue that is not consistently framed as a protection problem: 
the provision of everyday justice for displaced populations. These findings generate pressing 
questions about MINUSCA’s engagement with justice practices in CAR.  
                                                             
89 When carried out by armed groups, self-justice practices may be linked to the self-defence motivations that 
grounded the initial creation of the groups. Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 15 April 2019. 
90 Interview with MINUSCA actor, Bangui, 14 April 2019. 
91 Interview with humanitarian actor, Bangui, 13 April 2019. 
92 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. 
93 Interview with two MINUSCA actors, Bangui, 23 April 2019. Bambari is offered as a key example. 
94 This would compound the legitimacy problems the mission is already facing, with respect to its arrests of 
anti-balaka.  
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In closing, three key questions are articulated for policy makers and international actors 
working in and on CAR to reflect upon: 
1. Should concerns of everyday criminal justice fall within MINUSCA’s PoC 
mandate? 
 
There are many respects in which everyday justice fits naturally within the protection 
sphere: criminal threats and classic protection threats often overlap, both in the 
nature of the harm caused and the population that suffers it. Moreover, displaced 
populations in CAR themselves think of the justice problems they face as protection 
problems—whether or not they relate to personal physical integrity. Despite this easy 
alignment between justice and protection, there may be important strategic reasons 
for giving everyday justice its own sphere outside of the PoC rubric. A point that is 
hinted at throughout the brief is that there is a danger of PoC expanding so that it 
means everything to everyone. It merits emphasis that treating justice as a separate 
matter from protection should not be tantamount to ignoring everyday criminal 
justice as a problem in its own right. 
 
2. When arresting and detaining accused individuals, how should MINUSCA 
balance community security with the rights of the accused?  
 
MINUSCA staff dealing with processes of arrest and detention appear to be informed 
of the mission’s human rights commitments, and they do not wish to overstep these 
in their treatment of accused individuals. When such a commitment is paired with an 
awareness of prison overcrowding problems, however, it may lead to early re-
introduction of accused perpetrators into IDP sites. Such practices can seriously 
undermine the security of IDPs and also their perceptions of whether MINUSCA is a 
trustworthy protection actor.  
 
3. What kinds of (self-)justice practices by local populations is MINUSCA willing to 
support? Are there certain practices the mission will not condone? 
 
It seems clear enough that MINUSCA cannot be seen to endorse any justice practices 
that involve extra-legal violence or physical harm to individuals. Short of this, the 
mission needs to clarify which forms of self-justice it wishes to support and it must 
justify the basis upon which this decision is made. International law could offer one 
useful yardstick in developing appropriate policies on this issue, but, equally, 
operational and strategic concerns—such as the mission’s efforts to bolster national 
justice institutions in CAR—will need to be factored in. 
 
 
